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Abstract—The MAVLink is a lightweight communication pro-
tocol between Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and ground
control stations (GCSs). It defines a set of bi-directional messages
exchanged between a UAV (aka drone) and a ground station.
The messages carry out information about the UAV’s states and
control commands sent from the ground station. However, the
MAVLink protocol is not secure and has several vulnerabilities to
different attacks that result in critical threats and safety concerns.
Very few studies provided solutions to this problem. In this
paper, we discuss the security vulnerabilities of the MAVLink
protocol and propose MAVSec, a security-integrated mechanism
for MAVLink that leverages the use of encryption algorithms to
ensure the protection of exchanged MAVLink messages between
UAVs and GCSs. To validate MAVSec, we implemented it in
Ardupilot and evaluated the performance of different encryption
algorithms (i.e. AES-CBC, AES-CTR, RC4 and ChaCha20) in
terms of memory usage and CPU consumption. The experimental
results show that ChaCha20 has a better performance and
is more efficient than other encryption algorithms. Integrating
ChaCha20 into MAVLink can guarantee its messages confiden-
tiality, without affecting its performance, while occupying less
memory and CPU consumption, thus, preserving memory and
saving the battery for the resource-constrained drone.
Index Terms—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Security, MAVLink,
Encryption, GCS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are an
emerging technology that has attracted several applications
such as smart cities, border surveillance , traffic monitoring
[1], security, natural disaster monitoring, real-time object
tracking [2] and transport [3], [4].
The paper is accepted in the International Wireless Communications &
Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC) in Morocco, June 2019.
These flying vehicles are controlled either remotely from
a Ground Control Station (GCS) or autonomously by a pre-
programmed mission. When controlled remotely, the com-
munication between the UAV and the GCS is established
through a communication protocol. The Micro Air Vehicle
link (MAVLink) [5] is one of the most widely used protocols
for communication between UAVs and GCSs. MAVLink was
developed to be a flexible, lightweight, open source com-
munication protocol specifically used for the bidirectional
data exchange between the autopilot and the GCS. The GCS
sends commands and controls to the drone, while, the latter
sends telemetry and status information data [6] to the GCS.
MAVLink is also used to connect drones over the Internet [2],
[7]–[9].
MAVLink is used by several autopilot systems including
Ardupilot [10] and PX4 [11]. Ardupilot and PX4 are the
leading open source autopilot systems designed to control any
type of unmanned vehicles, including fixed-wing aircraft, and
various rotary-wing platforms, namely single, tri, quad, hexa,
octa copters and even submarines [10]. PX4 also offers similar
capabilities for UAVs and can be extended to underwater
systems.
Despite, the wide use of the MAVLink protocol it presents
vulnerabilities and is prone to several attacks including spoof-
ing, message forging and denial of service (DoS) as proven in
[8] and [12]. These vulnerabilities are mainly due to the fact
that the protocol does not implement any security mechanism
and does not adopt any encryption algorithm. Therefore,
the GCS communicates with the UAV over an unencrypted
channel, thus subject to several types of attacks.
In literature, a few studies have discussed possible security
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solutions for the MAVLink protocol. In [13], [14], the authors
used the Caesar cipher cryptography for data encryption
of MAVLink messages between the ground station and the
Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAV). They showed that a secret
key was clearly sent from the GCS to the drone, during
the establishment phase. An intruder, who may eavesdrop
the communication, could easily detect the key, and thus can
break all the security system. Moreover, the Caesar encryption
algorithms used in these works are known to be insecure and
vulnerable to crypt-analysis. In [15], the authors addressed
the MAVLink protocol security against passive attacks such
as eavesdropping and interception, and implemented the RC5
encryption algorithm to encrypt the MAVLink messages. How-
ever, the proposed method lacks an authentication mechanism
that protects communication from active attacks such as forg-
ing the message, identity spoofing, etc. It is worth noting that
a secure version of MAVLink is currently being discussed by
the protocol developers, but has not yet been developed [16].
In this paper, we suggest improving the MAVLink proto-
col security in order to protect the communication between
drones and GCSs. This allows to mitigate malicious attacks.
The proposed method involves the implementation of several
encryption algorithms, namely, RC4, AES-CBC, AES-CTR
and ChaCha20 to ensure the confidentiality of the exchanged
messages between UAV and GCS. We also evaluate their per-
formances in terms of memory usage and CPU consumption.
In summary, the four main contributions of this paper are
as follows:
• First, we identify the MAVLink protocol security threats.
• Second, we propose MAVSec, a MAVLink enhanced
version with cryptographic mechanisms to ensure confi-
dentiality of the exchanged messages between UAVs and
GCSs.
• Third, we implement the security mechanisms in Ardupi-
lot using the MAVLink protocol to demonstrate the
feasibility of the proposed solutions.
• Fourth, we prove the effectiveness through performance
evaluation of our proposal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses the related works. Section III describes
the MAVLink protocol. Section IV presents security threats
against the MAVLink protocol. Section V describes the pro-
posed cryptographic mechanisms to secure the MAVLink
protocol. Detailed simulation and experimental results are
presented and discussed in section VI. Finally, Section VII
provides some concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORKS
Ensuring security has become increasingly necessary and
important for the wide adoption of UAV systems. The existing
security methods proposed for UAV systems can be classified
into hardware [17], [18] and software approaches [13], [15],
[19].
In [17], a hardware-based implementation of the AES
protocol was proposed to secure the communication between
a ground control station (GCS) and the drone. An FPGA
module, connected to the drone embeds the cryptographic so-
lution: AES-CBC-MAC, was used to encrypt and authenticate
both commands and payload data transmitted between the
drone and the GCS. However, the hardware solution affects
negatively the system performance and power consumption
due to the extra hardware weight.
In [18], the authors proposed the idea of an additional
encrypted communication channel to enhance the security
of data in UAVs through Raspberry Pi. This channel was
designed to regain control of the UAV in case it was target
to attack. However, this hardware solution displays time delay
between GCS and Raspberry Pi and increases the CPU usage
on Raspberry Pi. The experimental setup is not applied to real
drones’ communication.
In the context of software based solutions, the authors in
[13] proposed a methodology for data encryption and authen-
tication of MAVLink messages between the ground station and
the UAV using Caesar cipher cryptography. However, its main
drawback is that it can be easily broken. Moreover, the results
have not been explicitly stated. In our paper,however, we
implement robust cryptographic methods and clearly present
our simulation results.
An encryption mechanism RC5 was used in [15] to secure
the MAVLink communication protocol. This study only pro-
vided a description of the protocol without any specific details
of testing and performance analysis. In our paper, we identify
and evaluate the performance of four cryptographic methods
used to secure the MAVLink protocol.
In [19], Marty presented a vulnerability analysis of the
MAVLink protocol, suggesting some cryptographic algorithms
to secure the MAVLink protocol and provide a methodology to
evaluate the cost of securing the MAVLink protocol. However,
in their work, the cryptographic techniques were not imple-
mented and the feasibility of the approach was not shown. In
our paper, we implement the encryption mechanisms into the
source code of the Ardupilot to enable a secure communication
using MAVLink protocol along with a performance evaluation.
III. MAVLINK SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
MAVLink is an open source, lightweight and header-only
protocol mostly used for bidirectional communications be-
tween GCSs and UAVs. MAVLink 1.0 was first released in
early 2009 by Lorenz Meier under LGPL license [20]. The
MAVLink 2.0 protocol [21] was released in early 2017 and is
the current recommended version. It is backward compatible
with the MAVLink 1.0 version and includes several improve-
ments over the MAVLink 1.0 version.
The MAVLink messages are of two types: (i.) commands
and control messages transmitted from the GCS to the UAV,
and, (ii.) state information messages (e.g., position, heartbeat,
and system status information) sent from the UAV to the GCS,
as depicted in Fig.1. Since the MAVLink protocol is used for
real-time communication; it is designed to be a lightweight
protocol. Figure 2 shows the structure of the MAVLink 2.0
packet.
Drone
Ground Control 
Station
Telemetry data 
and status 
information
Commands and 
controls data
Fig. 1. Communication link between UAV and GCS.
All MAVLink messages contain a header appended to each
data payload of the message. The header contains information
about the message while the payload contains the data carried
out by the message. The checksum is intended to verify the
integrity of the message, that should not be altered during its
transmission.
MAVLink protocol is a variable size protocol. The minimum
packet length of a MAVLink message is 11 bytes (STX, LEN,
INC FLAGS, CMP FLAGS, SEQ, SYS ID, COMP ID, MSG
ID, CKA and CKB) and the maximum packet length, with
full payload and signature, is 297 bytes. The payload size is
variable, its length depends on the parameters which are sent or
received during the communication. The signature field allows
the authentication of the message and verifies that it originates
from a trusted source.
MAVLink message types are identified by the ID field on
the packet, and the payload contains the appropriate data.
Several control and state messages are defined in the MAVLink
protocol. The most crucial message in MAVLink is the heart-
beat message. Initially, a drone should send the HEARTBEAT
message periodically (generally every second) to the ground
station to provide feedback of their status (to indicate that
the drone is active and still connected). This is a mandatory
message.
IV. SECURITY THREATS
With the increasing use of UAVs in military and civilian
applications, they are carrying sensitive and secure information
that can be sniffed by attackers. In fact, the MAVLink protocol
does not provide any kind of security and can be hacked
quite easily. There is no confidentiality, nor authentication
mechanism. The GCS communicates with drones over an
unauthenticated and unencrypted channel. Anyone with an
appropriate transmitter can communicate with the drone and
inject commands into an existing session, and thus can easily
impersonate any drone. Also, MAVLink message streams can
be easily intercepted and eavesdropped by hackers because
they are sent with no encryption.
According to [19], the MAVLink protocol is vulnerable to
attacks and does not provide the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability) security services. Thus, the MAVLink proto-
col could be exposed to different attacks such as Interception
(Attacks against the systems confidentiality), Modification
(Attacks against the systems integrity), Interruption (Attacks
against the systems availability).
Interception can be achieved by eavesdropping on channels.
The message contents are read by unauthorized users. Since
the MAVLink communication protocol is not always secured,
an intruder is able to intercept information about commands
sent to the UAV from GCS and steal other data sent in
the opposite direction. Authentication and encryption should
be used on the link to mitigate this risk and guarantee the
confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged data.
Modification means tampering with an original message.
MAVLink protocol does not ensure integrity which might
allow an attacker to effectively hijack the UAV from its
GCS. If there is no integrity protection mechanisms, malicious
attacks on the network or wireless channel interference may
cause information modification, and thus become invalid.
Interruption means that a message from/to a particular
service is blocked. An adversary disables the reception of
MAVLink control signals from the ground control by the
drone. The communication between the drone and the GCS
is blocked, and the aircraft will go into a lost link state.
Implementing strong authentication mechanisms can help mit-
igate the risk of unavailability. Various security threats against
the MAVLink protocol, with the corresponding mitigation
techniques are listed in Table I.
V. MAVSEC: SECURITY OF THE MAVLINK PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose MAVSec, a MAVLink enhanced
version with cryptographic mechanisms to mitigate the vul-
nerabilities presented in the MAVLink protocol in terms of
confidentiality.
Cryptographic algorithms are classified as symmetric algo-
rithms, which use symmetric keys or asymmetric algorithms,
which use a couple of public/private keys. Symmetric encryp-
tion is fast by design and consumes little energy, because the
same key is used for both encryption and decryption. This
makes it suitable for low-resource drones. However, asymmet-
ric mechanisms can cause severe computational, memory, and
energy overhead. Asymmetric cryptography is not suitable for
static communications [22].
Symmetric encryption algorithms are further classified in
two basic categories: stream ciphers (such as RC4, CTR mode
and ChaCh20) and block ciphers (such as AES). A block
cipher encrypts fixed-length groups of N bits, called block
of plaintext to a block of N bits of encrypted data, whilst a
stream cipher can encrypt plaintext of varying sizes.
ChaCha20 is a stream cipher developed by D. J. Bernstein
in 2008, based on the Salsa cipher principles, to provide
better diffusion and resistance against cryptanalytic attacks
[23], without losing performance on software platforms [24].
ChaCha20 is classified as a high-speed stream cipher although
it is technically a block cipher in counter mode. For instance,
ChaCha20 is often used by world leading companies like
Google and Mozilla as it offers safer and faster alternatives
[25].
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Fig. 2. MAVLink 2.0 packet structure.
TABLE I
SECURITY THREATS ON MAVLINK AND COUNTERMEASURES.
Security objective Threats Mitigations
Confidentiality
Eavesdropping
Data link interception
Man-in-the-middle
Identity spoofing
Hijacking
Data link encryption
Integrity
Packet injection
Man-in-the-middle
Fabrication
Message deletion
Message modification
Replay attack
Hash
Authentication
MAC
Availability
Command and control data link spoofing
Channel jamming
Routing attack
Denial of service
Flooding
Buffer overflow
Authentication
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the most widely
used symmetric cryptographic algorithm, which was chosen
as a secure encryption algorithm by the National Institute of
Science and Technology (NIST) [26] among other encryption
algorithms. AES is fast, flexible in block ciphers and has a
high security and performance as compared to other symmetric
encryption algorithms [27].
AES receives as input a plaintext block size of 128-bit and
the encryption key length, which is either 128, 192 or 256
bits. The input text is processed by using the given key and
applying a number of transformations to produce the output
text (ciphertext).
AES block cipher algorithm can operate in five modes:
Output Feedback (OFB), Electronic Code Book (ECB), Cipher
Feedback (CFB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), and Counter
(CTR) [28], [29]. In this paper, we choose the CBC and
CTR modes, since they are well known and widely used in
encryption to encrypt MAVLink payload.
A. Background on the encryption mechanisms.
In what follows, we describe the four cryptographic algo-
rithms used in our experiments, namely, (1) the Advanced
Encryption Standard in Counter Mode (AES-CTR), (2) the
Advanced Encryption Standard in Cipher Block Chaining
Mode (AES-CBC), (3) RC4 and (4) ChaCha20.
1) AES Counter Mode (CTR) : The Counter mode (CTR)
is a mode that turns a block cipher into a stream cipher and
therefore used for achieving confidentiality [30]. First, a stream
of input blocks is generated, called counters. The counters are
obtained from an initial counter IV , which is incremented
and used to encrypt each block in turn. Then a forward cipher
function is applied to these counters to produce a sequence
of output blocks ri that are exclusive-ORed with the plaintext
mi to produce the ciphertext ci.
Algorithm 1 explains the pseudo-code of AES-CTR encryp-
tion, where IV is the initial counter value, mi represents the
ith block of plain text, and ci represents the ith block of
ciphertext. Both IV + i and mi are independent. Decryption
transformation is identical to that of encryption. The main
difference is that the plaintext and ciphertext positions are
switched.
Counter mode (CTR) is employed for its simplicity and
efficiency because there is no need for a decoding function,
nor for padding, and it offers a large flexibility in the imple-
mentation. Besides its high level of security [31], it presents
high speed as it can be executed in parallel. Indeed, both
encryption and decryption can be achieved in parallel on
multiple blocks of plain or cipher data, which enables us to
achieve a maximum level of parallelism. Another alternative
is that CTR transforms block cipher into stream cipher, which
is strongly recommended for our implementation since the
stream cipher is more appropriate as MAVLink allows limited
buffering.
2) AES Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) : The Ci-
pher Block Chaining (CBC) [32] is a block cipher mode of
operation, known to be the most commonly used whenever
large amounts of data need to be sent securely. CBC mode
chains the previous ciphertext block with the current message
block before the cipher function. This mode is efficient at
Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code of CTR encryption.
Input : n-block message m = m1 . . .mn, and a block
cipher key k
Output: Ciphertext AES-encrypt-ctr (k,m) = c1 . . . cn
1 Initialization:
2 IV ← {0, 1}n ;
3 r0 ← IV ;
4 Encryption:
5 for i from 1 to n do
6 ri = (IV + i)k
7 end
8 for i from 1 to n do
9 ci = mi ⊕ ri
10 end
11 return c1 . . . cn
disguising any pattern in the plaintext: the encryption of each
block depends on all the previous blocks.
Algorithm 2 explains the pseudo-code of AES-CBC encryp-
tion. As shown in Algorithm 2, the CBC mode takes a secret
key k as input, an Initialization Vector IV , which is randomly
chosen with a length equal to the block length N , and the
plaintext message. The plaintext is divided into several blocks
P1 . . . PN , and each block is XOR− ed with the cipher data
of the previous block before it is encrypted. The result of
the XOR operation is encrypted with the key K to produce
ciphertext C1 . . . CN .
Decryption is thus the reverse process, which involves
decrypting the current ciphertext and then adding the previous
ciphertext block to the result. The IV and the encrypted
message are sent to the recipient, which will then process
this data using AES-CBC under the same key to check the
integrity of the message and recover the plaintext message.
Algorithm 2: Pseudo-code of CBC encryption.
Input : N -block message P = P1 . . . PN , and a block
cipher key k
Output: Ciphertext AES-encrypt-cbc (k, P ) = C1 . . . CN
1 Initialization:
2 IV ← {0, 1}n ;
3 C0 ← IV ;
4 Encryption:
5 for i from 1 to N do
6 Ci = (Pi ⊕ Ci−1)k
7 end
8 return C1 . . . CN
3) RC4 : It is the most popular and widely accepted
symmetric key stream cipher algorithm in network security
[33].
The encryption of a message in RC4 is achieved by gener-
ating a keystream to be XOR− ed with a stream of plaintext
to produce a stream of ciphertext. The pseudo code for RC4
is shown in Algorithm 3. It has two parts: the first is a
Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) whereas the second is the
Pseudo-Random Number Generation Algorithm (PRGA), that
generates a pseudo-random output sequence.
The KSA accepts the sized key k as input, that may range
between 8 and 2048 bits in multiples of 8 bits. It starts with
the identity permutation in S and uses the key continually
swapping values to produce a new unknown key-dependent
permutation. Since the only action on S is to swap two values,
the fact that S contains a permutation is always maintained.
The PRGA works by continually shuffling the permutation
stored in S as time goes on, each time picking a different value
from the S permutation as output. One round of RC4 outputs
an n bit word as keystream, which is further XOR− ed with
the plaintext to produce the ciphertext.
Algorithm 3: Pseudo code for RC4 stream cipher.
KSA
Initialization:
for i from 0 to 255 do
S[i] = i;
end
j = 0;
L= length of the key.
N= length of the Substitution box or
state.
K= key randomly chosen.
Scrambling:
for i from 0 to N-1 do
j = (j + S[i] +K[i mod L]);
swap(S[i], S[j]);
end
PRGA
Initialization:
i = 0;
j = 0;
Generation Loop:
i = i+ 1;
j = j + S[i];
swap(S[i], S[j]);
outputO = S[S[i] + S[j]];
The Stream cipher RC4 is efficient for real time processing.
The algorithm is simple, fast and easy to explain. It can be
efficiently implemented in both software and hardware.
4) ChaCha20 : The ChaCha20 encryption algorithm re-
quires the following parameters: a 256-bit encryption key, a
96-bit nonce, and a 32-bit Initial Block Counter to encrypt
an arbitrary-length plaintext [34].The output is an encrypted
message of the same length. ChaCha20 generates a keystream
by applying the ChaCha20 block function to the key, nonce,
and a blockcounter. Plaintext is then encrypted using this
keystream, with block i of the plaintext XOR − ed with the
output of the ChaCha20 block function, evaluated using the
block counter i. As the ChaCha20 block function is not applied
directly to the plaintext, no padding should be necessary.
Decryption is performed in the same way. The ChaCha20
block function is used to expand the key into a keystream,
which is XOR − ed with the ciphertext giving back the
plaintext.
B. MAVSec: Integration of encryption mechanisms into
MAVLink
In this section, we introduce our proposed approach
MAVSec and describe how the encryption mechanisms were
implemented into the MAVLink protocol.
The implementation involves the development and integra-
tion of the above-mentioned encryption algorithms both on
the UAV autopilot side and GCS side integrated with the
MAVLink protocol.
MAVLink messages contain a header with a MAVLink
Identifier ID that cannot be encrypted. Therefore, only the
MAVLink message payload can be encrypted since encrypting
the header would result in the recipient being unable to
recognize the appropriate MAVLink message type.
MAVLink makes use of a checksum to determine if a
message was changed and therefore, the checksum needs to
be recomputed after encryption. A solution to this would be to
perform the encryption before calculating the checksum and
decrypt after it is checked again.
Before sending any parameter through the payload, a heart-
beat message is sent from the UAV to the GCS in order to
verify that the system is ready and alive. The encryption is
performed from the UAV to GCS. The payload is encrypted
with the session key derived during the authentication phase,
and the checksum is computed after encryption to ensure that
the message is properly received by the ground station. The
UAV sends a message containing the encrypted payload to the
ground station. Once the message is received, the GCS, first
checks the checksum and then decrypts the payload.
The encryption algorithms AES-CTR, AES-CBC,
ChaCha20 and RC4 are developed both on the autopilot and
the GCS. The MAVLink source code is modified to include
cryptographic functions resulting in a successful encryption
and decryption. The payload is fed to the encryption algorithm
as an input to obtain encrypted data. At the receiver’s side,
the received encrypted data is decrypted. The MAVSec code
is available at Github [35].
VI. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In this section, we present a comprehensive study on the
performance of the encryption algorithms integrated to the
MAVLink protocol, in terms of the resource utilization such
as CPU processing time and memory consumption rate. Based
on the analysis of the obtained results, we discuss which algo-
rithm is better to use according to the mentioned performance
metrics.
A. Simulation environment settings
The experimental testbed consists of using a simulated
drone with the Ardupilot Software-In-The-Loop (SITL) [36],
which uses the same autopilot used in the real drone and
the same MAVLink communication protocol. The use of
a simulated drone generalizes straightforwardly to the case
of a real drone. More specifically, the setup used for our
experiments is as follows: We used a virtual drone executed
with the Ardupilot Software-In-The-Loop (SITL) simulator
[36]. It enables us to operate a Plane, Copter or Rover, without
the need for any hardware. We have compiled the source code
of Ardupilot to be able to integrate the encryption mechanisms
into the message stream exchanged between the autopilot
in the drone and the ground station. Besides, we used the
QGroundControl [37] ground station, which is an open source
ground control station (GCS) software application developed
by Lorenz Meier and written in C++. To allow the secure
communication between the autopilot of the SITL drone and
the QGroundControl, we have also integrated the encryption
algorithms into the QGroundControl to be able to decode
the cipher stream received and extract the original MAVLink
message. The GCS is connected to the simulated UAV via an
open source GCS software called MAV proxy [38].
The SITL simulator runs on a Linux virtual machine
(Ubuntu 14.04 TLS) running on computer with 2.9 GHz Intel
Core(TM) i7 CPU, 5.4 GB of memory. We used the ArduPilot
version 3, more specifically, a UAV copter as a SITL to testing.
To connect to the SITL, we used the port 14550 over the UDP
protocol.
B. Performance evaluation
The experiments were performed ten times to make sure that
the results comparing the different algorithms, are accurate and
valid. Table II shows the algorithm’s parameters used in this
experiment. Each algorithm was executed one after the other
TABLE II
ALGORITHMS SETTINGS.
Algorithm
Key size
(Bits)
Block size
(Bytes)
AES-CTR 256 Any length, in our case is thesame length of the payload data
AES-CBC 256 128
RC4 256 Any length, in our case is thesame length of the payload data
ChaCha20 256 Any length, in our case is thesame length of the payload data
so that each one can have full system resources at its disposal.
To understand the effect of an encryption oriented solution,
we compare the measured memory utilization, CPU con-
sumption and packets transmitted of the insecured MAVLink
protocol with the secured MAVLink protocol using crypto-
graphic implementations (MAVSec). The performance evalu-
ation comparison between the insecured MAVLink protocol
and MAVSec can measure the success of the implemented
encryption mechanism. In terms of packet transmission, it can
be clearly inferred from Fig.3, that MAVLink based stream
cipher ChaCha20 and MAVLink-CTR send more packets
compared to the MAVLink based CBC and RC4.
As expected, the AES-CBC requires more processing time,
so the number of transmitted packets will decrease. This can
be explained by the key-chaining nature of the CBC and the
fact that encryption is not performed in parallel. Also, the
plaintext sizes that are not a multiple of the block size need
to be padded which make the CBC unsuitable for encrypting
and sending more packets. The AES-CTR mode encrypts
and sends more packets because of its cipher type nature.
MAVLink-ChaCha20 sends more packets as compared to
MAVLink based CBC and CTR, because it is the fastest
data transmission algorithm compared to AES [34]. Thus,
ChaCha20 is suited to be used in lower powered UAV devices
and real time communication.
The insecured MAVLink protocol sends more packets than
the MAVLink-ChaCha20, but the difference is generally neg-
ligible.
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Fig. 3. Transmitted packets number (insecured MAVLink vs MAVSec).
Other important performance parameters are the memory
and CPU utilization. Figures 4 and 5 show graphs that compare
the average memory and CPU consumption of the insecured
MAVLink with a MAVLink based ChaCha20, CTR, CBC and
RC4.
As per the graph shown in figure 4, the MAVLink-RC4 is
the most resource intensive, in terms of memory utilization,
because the KSA and PRGA are executed sequentially in
the RC4 encryption algorithm, which requires the use of
more registers. However, the MAVLink-ChaCha20 takes less
memory space, making ChaCha20 a good fit for UAV devices.
According to Fig. 4, no difference can be observed between the
unsecured MAVLink protocol and the MAVLink-ChaCha20 in
terms of memory usage.
The CPU usage is the percentage of time a CPU is com-
mitted for only a particular process of calculations. It reflects
the load of the CPU. The more the CPU is used in the
encryption process, the higher the load of the CPU will be
[39]. The simulation results depicted in fig. 5 conclude that,
MAVLink-RC4 takes the highest CPU utilization time period,
wheras MAVLink-ChaCha20 consumes less CPU. This can
be explained by the fact that ChaCha20 is based on ARX
(Addition-Rotation-XOR) which are CPU friendly instructions
[40]. In contrast, the AES uses binary fields for the Sbox and
Mixcolumns computations, which are generally implemented
as a look up table to make it more efficient. Therefore,
including ChaCha20 encryption algorithm will not affect
the performance of the MAVLink protocol since MAVLink-
ChaCha20 is very close in CPU utilization to the insecured
MAVLink version.
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The performance evaluation comparison between the inse-
cured MAVLink protocol and MAVSec allows us to measure
the success of the implemented encryption mechanism. Our set
of simulation results were aimed to prove that ChaCha20 has
better performance and is more efficient than other encryption
algorithms. It can be considered as an excellent standard
encryption algorithm to be adopted to secure MAVLink proto-
col and guarantee confidentiality of the MAVLink messages,
without affecting its performance, consuming less memory
space and CPU in order to preserve the memory and save
the battery for resource-constrained drones.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed the vulnerability and security
threats against the MAVLink protocol, then we proposed dif-
ferent cryptographic solutions to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
The experimental study was achieved through implementing
the encryption algorithms in the MAVLink source code. From
the performance evaluation,we proved that ChaCha20 can
be applied to secure the MAVLink protocol as it maintains
confidentiality of the MAVLink messages without affecting
its performance. In our future work, we will focus on testing
and validating this implementation using a real scenario.
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